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"OF"AS A LOADED WORD: CONGRESS TESTS THE
BOUNDARIES OF ITS COMMERCE POWER

WITH AN AMENDMENT TO THE
FEDERAL MURDER-FOR-HIRE STATUTE

Michael P. Murphy*

"The regulationand punishment of intrastateviolence that is not directedat the
instrumentalities,channels, or goods involved in interstatecommerce has always
been the province of the States.
"'

INTRODUCTION

For Carl M. Drury, Jr., M.D., the third time was definitely not the charm. With
his third marriage apparently intolerable and looking to loose his matrimonial bonds,
Drury sadly settled on murder as his means to freedom.2 Like Dr. Jekyll, to the
community Drury seemed an upstanding citizen, generous with his time and a
devoted father of five.' Ironically, it was Drury's generosity that ultimately helped
bring him to justice. On one occasion in 2001, Drury invited his friend and patient,
Stephen Whatley, to stay with him when Whatley separated from his wife.4 During
that stay, Whatley, a U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
instructor, saw a very different side of Drury.5
Thinking he had found a sympathetic soul in Whatley, Drury asked for help in
having his wife murdered.6 Once he determined that Drury was serious, Whatley
reported the incident to the ATF's Savannah field office, and a trap was set for
* Michael P. Murphy is a J.D. candidate at the College of William & Mary School of
Law. He graduated from Hillsdale College with a bachelor of science in political economy.
He wishes to thank the editors and staff of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal for
their invaluable aid.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
2 See Terry Dickson, ATF InstructorSays DruryAskedHim To Kill; Physician
Ordered
Detained Until Trial, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Oct. 12, 2001, at Al, LEXIS, FLA Library,
FLATUN File.
3 Id.
' United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated by 358 F.3d
1280 (11 th Cir. 2004), vacatedby No. 02-12924,2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 761 (11 th Cir. Jan.
18, 2005).
' Id. at 1093.
6 Id.
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Drury.7 Another ATF agent, Louis Valoze, posed as the hit man and had a number
of telephone conversations and meetings with Drury to work out the details of the
murder.8 Although neither Valoze nor Drury left the borders of Georgia in the
commission of the crime, one of Drury's phone calls passed through a Jacksonville,
Florida switching center before reaching Valoze's cell phone in Georgia. 9 To a jury
of nine women and three men, this was enough to convict Drury under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1958 for using a facility in interstate commerce to effectuate a murder-for-hire
scheme. Drury was then sentenced to seventeen years in federal prison.1"
Drury appealed his conviction to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
challenging, among other things, the validity of federal jurisdiction."1 In September
2003, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Drury's conviction under § 1958, ruling that
federal jurisdiction was proper because Drury's telephone calls to Valoze were
temporarily routed through another state.' 2 In affirming the conviction, however,
the Eleventh Circuit construed § 1958 narrowly, declaring that actual interstate
activity was required for federal jurisdiction to attach.13 The court's opinion
represented the narrowest reading of the statute among the federal appeals courts
that had considered the issue, driving the interpretive wedge among the circuit
courts ever deeper.
On February 3, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its previous decision in
Drury and scheduled an en banc rehearing of the case for June 15, 2004.14 Noting
the uncertainty surrounding § 1958's jurisdictional element, the court instructed
counsel to focus their briefs and arguments on the following three issues:
1. Whether the jurisdictional element of the murder-for-hire
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), which criminalizes the "use [of] the
mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce," requires
that there be a showing that the facility was actually used in
interstate commerce or that it is sufficient to show that the
facility, and not its use, was in interstate or foreign commerce in
light of the statute's definition of a facility under § 1958(b)(2),
I Id. at 1093-94.
8Id.

9 Id. at 1094.
Terry Dickson, Drury Gets 17 Years in Plot To Kill Wife; "I Was Railroaded"Despite

10

Evidence, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 16, 2002, at Al, LEXIS, FLA Library, FLATUN File.

1 Drury, 344 F.3d at 1092.
Id. at 1104.
13 Id.
1

"4 Drury, 358 F.3d 1280; Letter from Thomas K. Kahn, Clerk of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, to All Counsel of Record in United States v. Carl M. Drury, Jr. (Mar. 5,
2004) [hereinafter Kahn Letter], at http://www.call .us.courts.gov/enbanc/issues/EB 12924

ISSUES.pdf.
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which provides that a "facility of interstate commerce includes
means of transportation and communication."
2. Address the federalism jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court insofar as it may relate to this case.
3. Whether the district court erred under United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), by instructing the jury that a pay
or cellular telephone is a per se facility in interstate commerce,
rather than asking the jury to decide whether such a phone is in
5
interstate commerce.'
On January 14, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion vacating the previous
order granting rehearing en banc and, rather than reinstate the panel opinion,
remanded the case to the panel for further consideration. 16 A model of judicial
efficiency, the Eleventh Circuit panel issued its opinion four days later."' Judge
Marcus, who concurred in the panel's original opinion but was sharply critical of
the majority's interpretation of § 1958, wrote for a unanimous panel. 8 The circuit
court affirmed Drury's conviction on the same grounds as their previous opinion,
noting that under either reading of § 1958, Drury's phone calls crossed state lines,
rendering him subject to federal jurisdiction. 19 The court further affirmed the
previous panel's ruling that the district court's jury instruction that a pay or cellular
telephone is a per se facility in interstate commerce was harmless error because there
was actual interstate activity.2"
Congress crafted the federal murder-for-hire statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958, as a
means for punishing people who employ instruments of interstate commerce in
committing a murder. 21 The law provides for federal punishment up to the death
Kahn Letter, supra note 14.
United States v. Drury, No. 02-12924, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 761, at *3 (11th Cir.
Jan. 14, 2005).
1 United States v. Drury, No. 02-12924, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 887 (11 th Cir. Jan. 18,
"
t6

2005).
" Id. Notably, Judge Marcus authored another significant Commerce Clause opinion for
the Eleventh Circuit only eight days earlier that served as a harbinger of the Drury decision.
In United States v. Ballinger,Judge Marcus, writing for a divided Eleventh Circuit sitting en
banc, vacated a previous panel's dismissal of a federal criminal conviction reinstating the
conviction of Ballinger, a Satan-worshipping church arsonist who was convicted of violating
a federal statute for setting a Georgia church ablaze. Ballinger,Nos. 01 -14872 & 01-15080,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 343 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2005).
'9 Drury, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 887, at *2.
20 Id. at *22-24.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2004). The Senate committee considering the legislation noted in
its report that "[t]he gist of the offense is the travel in interstate commerce or the use of the
facilities of interstate commerce or of the mails with the requisite intent." S. REP. No. 98225, at 306 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
1377
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penalty for planning or committing murder in exchange for something of pecuniary
value.22 Presumably designed as a tool to combat organized crime, the statute's
Achilles heel has been the ambiguously worded jurisdictional element. This ambiguity has caused division in the federal courts. Two circuits, the Fifth23 and the
Seventh,24 have ruled that federal jurisdiction arises even with the purely intrastate
use of a facility of interstate commerce occurring in the commission of the crime.
In contraposition, the Sixth Circuit25 and Eleventh Circuit26 have held that a
defendant's use of the facilities of interstate commerce triggered federal jurisdiction
only when the facility was actually used interstate. In December 2004, Congress
amended the statute to resolve the textual ambiguity that plagued the statute. 27 By
replacing the word "in" for "of' in the jurisdictional element of the statute, Congress
clarified and broadened the statute's jurisdictional reach to include purely intrastate
criminal activity.28 Unfortunately, this change brings the statute into conflict with
the Court's current Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Criminal law traditionally has been the province of state authority. 29 Extending

federal jurisdiction to crimes that are essentially local in nature and have only a
tenuous connection to interstate commerce portends a significant upset in the
balance of power between the federal government and the states. Furthermore,
Congressional expansion of federal jurisdiction indicates an important transfer of
power from the legislative branch to the executive branch in the form of prosecutorial discretion. Finally, applying the Court's framework for proper Commerce
Clause legislation further defines the contours of Congress's most often exercised
jurisdictional justification: the commerce power.
By amending the statute to broaden explicitly its jurisdiction in the murder-forhire statute to cover purely intrastate activity, Congress has tested the boundaries of
its commerce power, as construed in Lopez and Morrison, in the problematic realm
of electronic communication. With the Supreme Court seemingly at the cusp of a
leadership change, this rather small amendment could provide the impetus for a
major shift in the Court's judicial deference to Congress in matters involving
interstate commerce.
In consideration of the statute's text and the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 18 U.S.C. § 1958 as recently amended exceeds the commerce power of
Id.
United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 813 (2001).
United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 934 (2003).
25 United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 (1999).
26 United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089 (11 th Cir. 2003).
27 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 6704, 118 Stat. 3638.
28 id.
29 See, e.g., Edwin Meese, III, et al., The Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 1998 A.B.A.
22

23
24

SEC. CRIM. JUST. REP. 5, availableat http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/fedreport.html.
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Congress under the Constitution and violates traditional principles of federalism.
To pass Constitutional muster, Congress can extend federal jurisdiction for murderfor-hire prosecution only when a facility of interstate commerce is employed in
actual interstate activity during the commission of a crime.

I. TEXT AND HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 1958
A. Text
The federal murder-for-hire statute, the title of which reads: "Use of interstate
commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire," provides:
(a) Whoever travels in or causes another (including the intended
victim) to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses
or causes another (including the intended victim) to use the
mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, with
intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of
any State or the United States as consideration for the
receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to
pay, anything of pecuniary value, or who conspires to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more
than ten years, or both; and if personal injury results, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than
twenty years, or both; and if death results, shall be punished
by death or life imprisonment, or shall be fined not more
than $ 250,000, or both.
(b) As used in this section and section 1959 (1) "anything of pecuniary value" means anything of value
in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, a
commercial interest, or anything else the primary
significance of which is economic advantage;
(2) "facility of interstate or foreign commerce" includes
means of transportation and communication; and
(3) "State" includes a State of the United States, the District
of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or
possession of the United States.3"
The 2004 amendment substituted "facility of' for "facility in" in subsection (a),
and inserted "or foreign" after "interstate" in subsection (b)(2). 3 ' Prior to the
30

18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2004).

" See § 6704, 118 Stat. 3638.
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amendment, the inconsistency and ambiguity quickly surfaced in the statute's title
that employed the phrase "use of interstate commerce facilities," subpart (a) which
used the phrase "use ...any facility in interstate... commerce," and subpart (b)(2)
that used the term "facility of interstate commerce."32 While the amendment
clarified the jurisdictional reach of the statute, it also became subject to the Court's
invalidation.
B. History
The genesis of the federal murder-for-hire statute occurred in 1961 under the
Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering Act (Travel Act).33 With the Travel Act,
Congress aimed to take a bite out of organized crime and racketeering. 4 Congress
added the murder-for-hire statute to the Travel Act in 1984 as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act. 5 In 1988, the section was renumbered § 1958
and slightly amended. 36 Two years later 3 7 and again in 1994"s and 1996,' 9 Congress
slightly amended the statute, but did not alter the ambiguous language concerning
the interstate commerce requirement. Two other statutes shared the same definition
of "facilities of interstate commerce" with § 1958 but neither suffered from internal
textual conflicts nor did they face the jurisdictional dilemma.'
Buried deep within the colossal Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA) is an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1958 that changed one word
of the federal murder-for-hire statute's jurisdictional description and finally resolved
the longstanding and circuit-dividing textual ambiguity.4 While the amendment
32

18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2000) (emphasis added).

3 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Supp. III 1958).
See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalizationof Crime, 22 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 213, 242-43 (1984).
" Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1002(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2136 (1984). At the time of enactment
the statute was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1952A. Id.
36 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7058(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4403
(substituting "ten years" for "five years").
"7Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, §§ 1205(k), 3558, 104 Stat. 4789,
4831, 4927.
31Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 60003(a)(11), 140007(b), 320105, 330016(l)(L), (N), (Q), 108 Stat. 1796, 1969, 2033,
2111, 2147,2148.
3'Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, §§ 601(g)(3), 605(a), 110 Stat.
3488, 3500, 3509.
40 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b) (2000). Section 1959(b), which
immediately follows § 1958, shares the definition with § 1958 although the term is never
used anywhere in the statute. Section 2332(b) directly references § 1958(b)(2), yet concerns
international terrorism so no similar jurisdictional question arises.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 6704, 118 Stat. 3638, 3766.
'"
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changed only one word - replacing "in" with "of' - it portends the need for
Supreme Court clarification of the parameters of Congress's commerce power in the
realm of electronic communication and criminal law. Rarely has so much rested on
so little.
C. Legislative History of§ 1958
The legislative history for § 1958 is relatively meager. Prior to its enactment,
a senate report acknowledged the potential federalism problems created by the
statute, suggesting that the statute should be employed in limited circumstances
considering a number of factors, including the type of suspect and the relative
abilities of the state and federal agencies to investigate.42 The senate report also
indicated that state and federal authorities should collaborate to the extent possible
these
in these cases.43 According to the report, the only limit on federal power in
44
discretion.
prosecutorial
of
form
the
in
Attorney
U.S.
cases resides with the
Despite clearly advocating broad prosecutorial discretion, the senate report
failed to answer the important question of exactly when federal jurisdiction attached.
The report also failed to reconcile, much less mention, the seemingly conflicting
terms in the statute. Arguably the closest it came to resolving this issue was the
committee's distinction between travel in interstate commerce and the use of
interstate commerce facilities, which could indicate that federal jurisdiction would
arise whenever a facility of interstate commerce was employed, regardless of

S.REP.No. 98-225, at 304-05 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3483-84.
The Senate committee addressed the concerns about invoking federal jurisdiction and stated
that "the apparent involvement of organized crime figures or the lack of effective local
investigation because of the interstate features of the crime could indicate that Federal action
was appropriate." Id. at 305.
42

43

id.

4 Id. at 304-05. The Senate Committee's opinion on this point was refreshingly
unambiguous:
[T]he committee believes that the option of Federal investigation and
prosecution should be available when a murder is committed or
planned as consideration for something of pecuniary value and the
proper Federal nexus, such as interstate travel, use of the facilities of
interstate commerce, or use of the mails, is present. This does not
mean, nor does the Committee intend, that all or even most such
offenses should become matters of Federal responsibility. Rather,
Federal jurisdiction should be asserted selectively based on such
factors as the type of defendants reasonably believed to be involved
and the relative ability of the Federal and State authorities to
investigate and prosecute.
Id.
1381
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interstate use, in the commission of a murder-for-hire scheme.45 The Committee' s
concern for federalism problems may also indicate their intent to extend jurisdiction
to purely intrastate activity, or it could reflect their recognition that most murder-forhire cases are essentially local in nature even if the jurisdictional requirement of
interstate activity is met.
The original legislative history of § 1958 did little to clear the murky water of
its meaning, but generally seemed to support broader federal jurisdiction. Even so,
the senate report expressed that § 1958 was aimed at national organized crime, not
at local criminal activity. 46
Legislative history for the 2004 revision is virtually non-existent. Indeed, it
appears that the revision received little consideration before receiving summary
47
approval as "a technical corrections bill.
11. BACKGROUND: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Since the statute's inception in 1984, four circuit courts have confronted the
challenge of interpreting the federal murder-for-hire statute.4 8 Neither the Bureau
of Justice Statistics nor any state keeps statistics on murder-for-hire prosecutions so
it is difficult to determine the prosecutorial effect of the federal law. Perhaps
indicative of the building momentum regarding this issue and application of the law,
all four cases were decided in the last five years. 49 The statute's wooly language
proved to be an open invitation to diverse interpretation by the courts. In the most
recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit construed § 1958 narrowly, finding, as the
Sixth Circuit did in 1999,5" that the facilities of interstate commerce must be
engaged in actual interstate activity for federal jurisdiction to arise."
Taking the opposite position, both the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit"
held that mere intrastate use of interstate commerce facilities is adequate to invoke
federaljurisdiction. As the 2004 amendment indicates, Congress sided with the Fifth

and Seventh Circuits when clarifying the law. Notably, none of the circuit courts
considered whether the statute, as construed, exceeded Congress's commerce power.
" 'The gist of the offense is the travel in interstate commerce or the use of the facilities
of interstate commerce or of the mails with the requisite intent and the offense is complete
whether or not the murder is carried out or even attempted." Id. at 306.
" See id. at 304-05.
47 H.R. REP. No. 108-505, at 8 (May 20, 2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_Congreports&docid=f:hr505.108.pdf.
48 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 39-42.
50 United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 (1999).
51 United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
52 United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 813 (2001).
53 United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 934 (2003).
1382
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A. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to weigh in on the proper
reading of the pre-revision federal murder-for-hire statute in United States v.
Weathers.54 While noting that Congress's intent in this statute was unclear,5 5 the
court determined that 18 U.S.C. § 1958 required interstate activity by the defendant
to establish federal jurisdiction."
The Weathers court emphasized that the phrases "facility in interstate
commerce" and "facility of interstate commerce" were purposefully distinct, with
Congress intending to regulate two separate categories of activity." In divining
which phrase defined the jurisdictional nexus, the court concluded that subsection
(a), which creates the criminal offense, controls subsection (b), which merely has a
definitional character.58
Interstate activity did not need to be direct to satisfy the jurisdictional nexus,
according to the Sixth Circuit." In this case, telephone calls to the defendant's
cellular phone provided the interstate activity sufficient for federal jurisdiction,
despite the fact that "the signal that ... connected the two parties was ultimately
intra state." 60 The only interstate activity was the cellular telephone service
provider's search signal that was sent out when a call was placed to the defendant's
cellular phone. 61 As soon as the defendant's phone was located by one of the cell
sites, the interstate cell phone signal was terminated.6" Thus, according to the Sixth
Circuit, § 1958 required the interstate use of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce, but that interstate activity need not be direct, only essential to the use of
the instrumentality.63

169 F.3d 336.
" Id. at 342 ("We would be remiss, however, if we failed to point out that the intent of

14

Congress, as expressed in the inconsistent provisions in § 1958(a) and (b)(2), is far from
clear.").
56 Id. ("[I]n order to establish the court's jurisdiction under § 1958, the government must

show that the defendant used a 'facility in interstate commerce.'").
57 id.

58 Id. The court dismissed the idea that Congress intended the phrases to be inter-

changeable. Id.
59 Id.
60

id.

"' Id. The defendant and investigating law enforcement officers were in Kentucky at all
times during these telephone calls. Id. at 339. Because of the proximity of Louisville,
Kentucky, to the Indiana state line, when a call is made to a cellular phone, search signals
are sent out to cell sites in both Kentucky and Indiana. See id.
62

Id.

63 Id. at 342.
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Notably, the Sixth Circuit's decision in the 2002 case United States v. Cope64
created an interpretational puzzle when it adopted the Fifth Circuit's statutory
reading of § 1958.65 The Cope court expressly limited its analysis to the relationship
between the word "mail" and "in interstate or foreign commerce." 66 However, the
court also seemed to adopt the Fifth Circuit's general interpretation that "in
interstate or foreign commerce" modifies "facility. ' 67 This case further muddied the
interpretive water surrounding § 1958.
B. The Fifth Circuit
United States v. Marek was the leading case in support of a broad reading of
pre-revision § 1958.68 In Marek, the Fifth Circuit engaged in a lengthy analysis of
the federal murder-for-hire statute and concluded that the facility, not the use, had
to be interstate to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of § 1958.69 The court was
satisfied that
when § 1958 is read as a whole and viewed in context as part of
the power of Congress to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even when the threat comes
from intrastate activities, it becomes clear that thefacility, not its
70
use, is what must be "in interstate or foreign commerce."
To the Fifth Circuit, if an interstate commerce facility was generally used in
interstate commerce, the actual use relied upon to establish a federal nexus need not
be actually interstate, but could be purely intrastate.7'
While the Marek court applied a number of theories of statutory interpretation
to § 1958, the court ultimately concluded that "the statute is unambiguous and clear
on its face. ' 72 First, the court considered the structure of the statute and concluded

6 United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,540 U.S. 995 (2003).
65 Id. at 771 ("As a matter of statutory construction [of § 1958], we agree with the Fifth
Circuit's analysis."). The court concluded that "'in interstate commerce'
'facility,' . . not 'to use."' Id.

. . .

modifies

6 Id. ("[W]e note that Weathers does not interpret the word 'mail,' but rather the phrase
'facility in interstate or foreign commerce,' and is thus inapposite here.").
67 id. ("'[I]n interstate or foreign commerce' modifies 'facility' .... ").
68 United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 813 (2001).
69 id.
70 id. at 320 (footnote omitted).
71

id.

Id. at 321. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that the statute's title, while not
dispositive, heavily weighed in favor of its interpretation. Id.
72
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that the phrase "in interstate or foreign commerce" modified "facilities," not "use."/
Second, the court found that the statutory context cut against any meaningful
distinction between "of' and "in" as used in the statute.74 The court also relied on
the legislative history to support its finding.75 According to Marek, the two phrases
found in subsections (a) and (b) were intended to be interchangeable.76 The court
found that the surrounding statutes indicated that § 1958 aimed to regulate even the
intrastate use of interstate facilities.77
In discerning a constitutional basis for the statute, the court determined that
Congress enacted § 1958 under the authority found in the second prong of the Lopez
framework. 78 This second prong of the commerce power permits Congress "to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce."79
The dissent in Marek interpreted § 1958 completely differently, finding that the
statute required that the facility's particular use be in interstate or foreign commerce
Contrary to the majority, the dissent
during the commission of the offense."
argued early on that the statute was ambiguous.8 The dissent employed various
8 3
82
canons of construction, including the clear statement rule and the rule of lenity,
and
to ultimately conclude that § 1958 had to be read in favor of the defendant
4
jurisdiction.
federal
trigger
to
activity
therefore required actual interstate
"' Id. at 316 (noting also that a "conclusion - that 'in interstate or foreign commerce'
modifies 'use' - would require a strained structural interpretation of the statute").
" Id. at 319 n.44 (Although the majority recognized "that similarly varying
phraseology ...

can have statutory significance," it determined that there was no such

significance in § 1958 due to legislative history and grammatical structure.).
15 Id. at 321. The court exclusively relied on a 1983 Senate Judiciary Committee report
issued before § 1958 was enacted.
76 Id. at 322.
17 id. at 323.
78 Id. at 317 ("When it adopted § 1958, Congress was acting within the second of three
broad categories identified by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez as conduct
appropriately subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.") (footnotes omitted). The
problem with this conclusion arises out of the fact that § 1958 was enacted in 1984, over ten
years before Lopez was decided. At the time of passage, the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence was quite different and significantly more deferential to Congress. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICEs § 3.3.1 (2d ed.

2002) (describing the breadth of the Commerce Clause power in the context of criminal law).
At the time, in criminalizing even purely intrastate activity, Congress needed only a rational
basis for believing the activity affected interstate commerce. See id.
" United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
80 Marek, 238 F.3d at 324 ("I find that § 1958 requires that the use of the facility be in
interstate or foreign commerce .. ")(Jolly, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 326.
82
83
84

Id.
Id. at 327-28.
Id.
1385
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C. The Seventh Circuit
In United States v. Richeson,8 5 the Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit, finding that the purely intrastate use of a facility of interstate
commerce was sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. 6 Finding that telephone
lines were facilities of interstate commerce, Mr. Richeson's mere use of a telephone,
even if purely intrastate, was adequate to attach federal jurisdiction.87
D. The Eleventh Circuit
In Drury, the Eleventh Circuit, for the first time, faced the challenge of
interpreting and applying the federal pre-revision murder-for-hire statute.8" After
an examination of the legislative history of the Travel Act and applying various
canons of statutory construction, the majority determined that federal jurisdiction
only arose when there was actually interstate criminal activity. 89 While noting that
reliance on legislative history was unnecessary to reach a proper interpretation of
the statute, 9 the Drury court asserted that the legislative history of the Travel Act,
under which § 1958 was later added, indicated that the purpose of the Act was to
criminalize certain activities that involved interstate activity.91 Likewise, the
court concluded that the specific legislative history relating to § 1958 indicated
Congress's intent for the jurisdictional nexus to require interstate activity.92
The Drury court applied several canons of statutory construction in concluding,
in contrast to the Fifth Circuit, that § 1958 is inherently ambiguous.93 After
338 F.3d 653 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,540 U.S. 934 (2003).
Id. at 660 ("We believe there is only one way to read the plain language of the murderfor-hire statute, and that is to require that the facility, and not its use, be in interstate or
foreign commerce.").
87 Id. at 661.
88 United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 2003).
89 Id. at 1095-1104. "[W]e conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)'s jurisdictional element
requires that a defendant must actually use a facility in a manner that implicates interstate
commerce, not just that the facility itself possess the capability of affecting interstate
commerce." Id. at 1104.
90 Id. at 1102.
85
86

91 Id.

9' Id. at 1103-04 ("[I]t would make little sense for the Subcommittee expressly to indicate
that an 'interstate telephone call is sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction' if it intended that
all phone calls - regardless of origin or destination (i.e., even intrastatecalls) - could
achieve this end.").
9' Id. at 1099-1104 (employing such canons as the rule against surplusage, the clear
statement rule, and the rule of lenity); id. at 1099 ("[T]he structure and language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1958 make it impossible to discern a 'plain and unambiguous meaning .... ' (quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997))).
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determining that the plain meaning of § 1958 was indefinite, the court sought to give
every word meaning while at the same time harmonizing it language. From this
exercise, the court concluded that § 1958 "applies solely to facilities that are actually
used in interstate commerce." 94 In support of this conclusion, the court applied the
clear statement rule, which requires Congress, whenever it "intends to alter the
usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government[,] to
make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' 95
Finding that § 1958 encroached upon the traditional powers of the states, the court
concluded that Congress did not clearly indicate its intention to alter the federal-state
balance in § 1958, and thus the statute should be construed in a manner that
minimized the federal encroachment on state police powers.96
The Drury court, like the Marek court, supported a narrow interpretation of
§ 1958 with the rule of lenity, which states that "when there are two rational readings
of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only
when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language."97
Although the court read § 1958 to require actual interstate activity to trigger
federal jurisdiction, the court also implicitly held that there were no substantive
minimums for the amount of interstate activity. 98 In fact, it held that the mere
routing of an electronic telephone signal through a Florida switching facility from
one person in Georgia to another in the same state was sufficient to satisfy the
jurisdictional nexus.'
The concurrence strongly disagreed with the jurisdictional interpretation of the
statute and concluded that merely using a facility that involved interstate commerce,
even if purely intrastate, sufficed to support federal jurisdiction."
E. Other Courts
The First Circuit avoided interpreting the jurisdictional requirements of § 1958
when the appellant in United States v. Houlihan1 ' failed to contest the prosecution's
" Id. at 1100. The court dismissed the idea that Congress intended the words "in" and
"of' to be interchangeable, instead finding that the words are harmonious, with subsection
(a) defining the jurisdictional nexus requirement, and subsection (b) serving not a
definitional, but an exemplary role. Id.
" Id. at 1100 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
96

Id. at 1100-01.

" Id. at 1101 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987)).
98 Id. at 1105 ("[It is of no moment that Drury's telephone calls to Valoze only
incidentally and unintentionally ventured out of state.").
99 Id.
'"

Id. at 1111 (Marcus, J., concurring) ("I have little doubt that the purely intrastate use of

an instrumentalityof interstatecommerce is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 1958.").
'0'92 F.3d 1271 (lst Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118 (1997).
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claim that the use of telephones satisfied the required jurisdictional nexus under
§ 1958.1°2
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has had
two occasions to interpret pre-revision § 1958, but has reached conflicting conclusions. 3 Judge Preska, in the 1994 case United States v. Stevens,"° determined that
the intrastate use of an interstate paging system satisfied the jurisdictional minimum standards of the murder-for-hire statute because the paging signals were sent
across state lines.' The court did not engage in a lengthy analysis, but found that
even under the narrower construction, the jurisdictional nexus was met by the
paging signal.
Two years later in United States v. Paredes,' 6 Judge Scheindlin concluded that
the intrastate use of an interstate paging system did not satisfy the jurisdictional
nexus under pre-revision § 1958, even though the paging signals crossed state
lines. ' 7 The court warned of the inherent danger in extending federal jurisdiction
to cases where the sole interstate activity was merely an electronic signal which
crossed state lines to connect two people in the same state.'08
HI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

§ 1958

The federal murder-for-hire statute implicates two areas of constitutional law
upon which the Court could pass judgment: (1) the extent of Congress's commerce
power, and (2) the Tenth Amendment's reservation to states of the powers not
constitutionally delegated to the federal government.109 Notably, none of the circuits
have considered the constitutionality of § 1958 because it has not been directly
challenged on those grounds.

'02 Id. at 1292. Although the court assumed that the mere use of telephones was sufficient
to support federal jurisdiction, it did so only on procedural grounds. The court did not
substantively consider the ambiguity of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. See id.
03 United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), afftd, 162 F.3d 1149 (2d
Cir. 1998); United States v. Stevens, 842 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
" 842 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
'o' Id. The Sixth Circuit in deciding United States v. Weathers, followed the same
reasoning to establish the requisite jurisdictional nexus (i.e., interstate activity) when all
parties involved are in the same state. See Weathers, 169 F.3d at 340.
"0 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
107 Id.
Id. at 590 ("By allowing federal jurisdiction to expand in lock-step with
communications technology, the government threatens to transform virtually all murder-forhire schemes that involve electronic forms of communication into federal crimes . .
'0' U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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A. Congress'sCommerce Power
1. Statutory Context
While Congress's revision of § 1958 may have occurred in a relative vacuum
of constitutional discussion, consideration of the constitutional ramifications of this
revision deserves some statutory context. A look at similar criminal statutes
employing interstate commerce as the jurisdictional hook reveals an inconsistent
patchwork of phrasing that yields little insight into Congress's general understanding of its authority under the Commerce Clause to criminalize conduct, or
perhaps reveals that by amending § 1958, Congress sought to preempt Supreme
Court review of this statute's jurisdictional element. " Congress defines "interstate
commerce," as used in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, rather strangely. Instead of
directly defining the term, it describes what the term includes: "commerce between
one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State,
Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.""'
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Lopez and Morrison
The Commerce Clause permits Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.""' 2 The Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has swung back and forth across a broad
interpretive spectrum throughout the Court's history.1 3 Today, the Court interprets
the Commerce Clause relatively narrowly, applying the three-pronged framework
outlined in United States v. Lopez." 4 In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free
School Zone Act of 1990 (GFSZA) as exceeding Congress's commerce power." 5
Under the Lopez framework, Congress may regulate activity that falls into any of
three broad categories: (1) "the use of channels of interstate commerce"; (2) "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.... even though the threat may come only
"' For example, the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000), to which the murder-for-hire
law was later added, contains both a broader substantive prohibition ("any crime of violence
to further any unlawful activity") and a narrower jurisdictional element ("Whoever travels
in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce") than § 1958. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2000). The manifest incongruity in the
jurisdictional elements of §§ 1952 and 1958 suggest a reactionary amendment to § 1958 to
resolve the circuit split before the Supreme Court would have the opportunity to further
clarify (and possibly narrow) the parameters of Congress's commerce power.
"
18 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, § 3.3.1.
U.S. 549 (1995).
" Id. at 549-50.
"

114 514
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from intrastate activities"; and (3) any "activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce." '" 16 In Lopez, the government proposed that the law, which
prohibited possession of a firearm within a certain distance of a school, fell under
the third prong of the commerce power." 7 The Court in Lopez was unpersuaded by
this reasoning because Congress made no attempt to link possession of a firearm
with interstate commerce. 18 After the decision, Congress amended the statute to
include the necessary interstate commerce connection." 9
The Court affirmed the three-pronged Lopez framework in United States v.
Morrisonwhen it struck down § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA). 2 ° Congress created VAWA to provide a federal civil remedy for victims
of gender-motivated crimes of violence, justifying its authority to do so under the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2' Defending its authority
before the Court, the Government justified its commerce power under the third
prong of the Lopez framework, alleging that the statute was a "regulation of activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce." 122
As it did in Lopez, the Court analyzed VAWA under the "substantially affects"
prong by considering four factors: (1) whether the regulated activity was economic
in nature, (2) whether the jurisdictional reach was expressly limited to activity with
an explicit connection to or effect on interstate commerce, (3) whether Congress
made any findings regarding the effects of the regulated activity upon interstate
commerce, and (4) the strength of the link between the regulated activity and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 2 3 Like the GFSZA, the Court struck down
the VAWA, ruling that in consideration of the aforementioned factors, the link

Id. at 558-59; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000). Learning its
lesson from Lopez, Congress supported its legislation with substantial information on the
aggregate economic impact of crimes of violence against women, attempting to fit the law
within the third prong of the Lopez framework. Id. at 614. The Court rejected this attempt,
finding instead that gender-motivated violent crimes are not economic activities, regardless
of proof of a cumulative economic impact. Id. at 617.
"' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 563-64.
18 Id. at 564-68.
"' Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2003) ("It shall be unlawful for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or
foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school zone."), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988) (It is a federal offense "for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.").
120 Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
121 Id. at 605-07.
122 Id. at 609.
113 Id. at 610-12.
116
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between the activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was too
24
attenuated to pass constitutional muster.
Even with this narrowed interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress
may still regulate purely intrastate criminal activity. In 1971, the Court ruled that
Congress may employ the Commerce Clause to regulate purely intrastate activity
that it considers to misuse, threaten, or harm the legitimate activities of interstate
commerce.2 5 The case, Perez, focused on a federal statute that criminalized intrastate loan sharking activities. 126 In upholding the statute, the Court relied upon the
fact that Congress had made specific findings regarding the aggregate interstate
effect of local loan sharking. 27
' Congress's primary justification for the statute was
that local loan sharking activities "s[i]phon[ed] funds from numerous localities to
finance its national operations."' 128 It should be noted that while Perez was not
overruled by Lopez, it was decided during a time when the Court gave significantly
more deference to Congress regarding Commerce Clause legislation than it does
today. 129 Overlaying the Lopez and Morrison decisions on Perez, the notion of
criminalizing purely intrastate activity remains valid, but the activity must now
substantially affect interstate commerce without the aid of aggregation.
The federal circuits have grappled with a similar issue when interpreting the
Hobbes Act' 30 which makes robbery and extortion that "obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce" a federal crime.' It is a "well-established rule that a robbery or extortion that depletes the assets of a business operating in interstate commerce will
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Hobbes Act by a minimal showing of
effect on commerce."' 13 2 On the other hand, a number of circuit courts have held
that where the robbery or extortion is of an individual, as opposed to a business, a
1 33
more substantial demonstration of the effect on interstate commerce is required.
Id. at 617.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
126 Id. at 149-50.
121 Id. at 154-56. Although the Court's decision seemed to rely upon Congress's
demonstrated proof that local loan sharking practices affect interstate commerce, the Court
noted that such a particularized finding was not necessary. Id. at 156.
128 Id. at 157.
129 See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
"0 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
131 Id.
132 United States v. Jamison, 299 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
J24

125

1196 (2003).
133See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 282 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), afftd, 367 F.3d
1148 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting the distinction between robberies of individuals and those of
businesses and adopting the Collins test for the former); United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d
234, 238 (6th Cir. 2000) (remarking that where "the criminal act is directed at a private
citizen, the connection to interstate commerce is much more attenuated"); United States v.
Quigley, 53 F.3d 909, 910-11 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that robberies "normally have a lesser
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Although the Court has not considered the propriety of these jurisdictional rules,
applying this distinction to § 1958, federal jurisdiction over an intrastate murder-forhire that was related to or motivated by a larger business or financial interest would
not require a showing of a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 34 The other
side of the coin, of course, is that cases like Drury, Weathers, Marek, and Richeson,
without interstate travel, would fall outside the reach of federal jurisdiction.
3. Lopez and Morrison Applied
At the time when Congress amended the Travel Act to include a murder-for-hire
provision, the Court was extending extreme deference to Congress's Commerce
Clause legislative decisions, upholding any regulation of activity that had a rational
relationship to interstate commerce. 35 In fact, until United States v. Lopez, the
Court upheld every Commerce Clause regulation of private activity.' 36 Undoubtedly, § 1958 would have passed constitutional muster had it been examined by the
Court before 1995. Since that time, however, the Court has developed a critical eye
for the use of the Commerce Clause to define and punish criminal activity.
Applying the Court's Commerce Clause framework to § 1958 presents a few
challenges, for determining which prong of the framework outlined in Lopez § 1958
falls under is not immediately clear. Under the first prong, Congress may regulate
the channels of interstate commerce.'37 While § 1958 prohibits the use of the mail
or any facility of interstate commerce, the statute is clearly aimed at murder-forhire. This is not a regulation of the pathways of interstate commerce, the scope
of the first prong of the Court's framework. As such, § 1958 is ill-fit for the first
prong of Lopez.
effect on interstate commerce when directed at individuals rather than businesses"); United
States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1121 (1995). The court
affirmed as follows:
Criminal acts directed toward individuals may violate section
1951(a) only if: (1) the acts deplete the assets of an individual who is
directly and customarily engaged in interstate commerce; (2) if the acts
cause or create the likelihood that the individual will deplete the assets
of an entity engaged in interstate commerce; or (3) if the number of
individuals victimized or the sum at stake is so large that there will be
some "cumulative effect on interstate commerce."
Id. at 100 (citations omitted) (quoting Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1285 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
' This approach would also tend to focus the use of § 1958 on its original intended
target -

organized crime.

135 CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 78, § 3.3.4 (discussing the Commerce Clause from 1937

to 1995).
136

'

Id. § 3.3.1.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
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The second prong of Lopez permits Congress to regulate the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, i.e., those things that move goods and people through
interstate commerce channels. 138 Again, with § 1958 Congress primarily took aim
at murder-for-hire, not the misuse of instrumentalities. Although the jurisdictional
hook for each of the aforementioned cases was the use of an interstate instrumentality, namely a wireless communication device, § 1958 regulates violent crime
that is not directed at the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and as such does
not fit under the second prong of the Lopez framework
Under the third prong of Lopez, Congress has authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate activities that "hav[e] a substantial relation to interstate
commerce. 13 9 While § 1958 clearly regulates a type of commercial activity, albeit
illegal activity, the question remains whether such economic activity is sufficiently
related to interstate commerce for constitutional justification.
Applying the four factors for determining a substantial effect on interstate
commerce reveals that a close question exists whether the federal murder-for-hire
statute can survive judicial scrutiny under the third prong. 4" Preliminarily, determining whether the regulated activity, murder-for-hire, is economic in nature
depends on the importance assigned to the various elements of the crime. Murderfor-hire does involve a transaction, but the harm is the murder, not the economic
activity. Contrast this with loan sharking for example, where the usurious interest
rate and harsh repayment terms are essential elements of both the transaction and the
actual harm. With murder-for-hire, the economic element of this violent crime is
essential only in the legal sense, for without the payoff, there is no murder-for-hire.
Nevertheless the economic transaction is not ultimately necessary for the actual
harm; the fact that a murder was paid for rather than performed merely as a favor,
for example, does not affect the harm suffered by the victim. On balance, it is the
murder, not the transaction, that Congress ultimately aims to prevent, and therefore
murder-for-hire should not be classified as economic in nature. Even if it is an
economic activity under the first factor, it is unlikely that this, standing alone, will
convince the Court that murder-for-hire substantially affects interstate commerce.
Congress did not limit the application of the murder-for-hire statute to activity
with an explicit connection to interstate commerce because both intrastate and
interstate murder-for-hires fall within § 1958's jurisdiction. The second factor is
138

Id.

139 Id.

at 558-59.

The four factors for determining whether a regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce are: (1) whether the regulated activity was economic in nature, (2)
whether the jurisdictional reach was expressly limited to activity with an explicit connection
to or effect on interstate commerce, (3) whether Congress made any findings regarding the
effects of the regulated activity upon interstate commerce, and (4) the strength of the link
between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce. United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000).
"
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thus not met by this statute. The third factor is also not met. Unlike the VAWA,
nowhere in the meager legislative history did Congress make any findings regarding
the effects of murder-for-hire upon interstate commerce.
The strength of the link between murder-for-hire and a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is not as easily determined. Like the GFSZA, which the Court
struck down in Lopez, § 1958 has no jurisdictional requirement that the activity
affect interstate commerce. However, the activity regulated in § 1958 is economic
(payment for murder), which differentiates the statute from the GFSZA and the
VAWA. Mere economic activity, however, does not suffice for reliance on the
Commerce Clause; the activity must substantially affect interstate commerce. 4 '
Unlike with the VAWA, Congress made no attempt to relate the activity of murderfor-hire to a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Considered independently, a single murder-for-hire would rarely affect interstate
commerce in any perceptible way. Where the robbery or extortion is of an individual, as opposed to a business, a number of circuits have required a more substantial
demonstration of the effect on interstate commerce. However, because almost any
private activity if aggregated over the entire national economy, from the cultivation
of a backyard vegetable garden to slander of a city councilman, could be characterized as having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the commerce power
theoretically has no bounds.' 42 Recognizing this, the Court has "reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely
on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce."' 43 This limitation of
aggregation to economic conduct makes the application to § 1958 uncertain. While
murder-for-hire is technically an economic activity, it is also violent criminal
conduct. Given the essentially local nature of this type of crime and the ancillary role
of the transaction, it seems likely that the Court would bar the use of aggregation to
justify jurisdiction. Without the aid of aggregation, § 1958 resembles the VAWA
in this element - the link between the regulated activity, in this case murder-forhire, and a substantial effect on interstate commerce appears fatally attenuated.
41 Lopez,

514 U.S. at 558-59.

This might be seen as the legal-economic analog to the Butterfly Effect, simply
expressed in a nursery rhyme:
For want of a nail the shoe was lost;
For want of a shoe the horse was lost;
For want of a horse the rider was lost;
For want of a rider the battle was lost;
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
Mother Goose Nursery Rhymes, For Want of a Nail, available at http://www.mothergoose.com/Rhymes/frhymes.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
"n'Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. The Court further defined Congress's commerce power,
requiring that if the regulated crime is purely intrastate, it must be "directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce." Id. at 618.
142
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Whether murder-for-hire substantially affects interstate commerce depends on
the emphasis the court considering the statute places on the elements of the crime.
Given the Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison,it is unlikely the Court
would make such a declaration concerning murder-for-hire.
4. Alternative Approaches
Faced with the challenge of reconciling § 1958 with Lopez and Morrison, the
Court could narrowly read the statute to fit it within the scope of the Commerce
Clause's parameters rather than ruling the law altogether unconstitutional.'" This
approach, however, includes constitutional dangers of its own. By narrowing the
interpretation of a statute that otherwise would not pass constitutional muster, the
Court in some ways validates Congress's expansion of federal criminal law through
tenuous jurisdictional hooks. Employing this method of statutory construction in
areas abounding in constitutional ambiguity makes sense, but danger lies with the
statute's application in more certain constitutional circumstances, as it provides a
powerful incentive for Congress to maximize its jurisdictional reach. 4 '
Further justification for granting federal jurisdiction over purely intrastate
murder-for-hire, at least in situations involving technologies like cellular phones as
in the Drury case, may be found in the fact that wireless communication depends on
the use of the wireless spectrum, which is owned by the public, regulated by the

supra note 78, § 3.3. In two cases after Morrison,
United States v. Jones and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,the Supreme Court
has narrowly interpreted federal laws to avoid "constitutional doubts"
as to whether Congress exceeded its commerce power. In each
instance, the Court did not declare the federal statute unconstitutional,
but instead used the recent restrictive interpretations of the commerce
power as a reason for limiting the scope of the federal laws.
Id. § 3.3.4, at 265 (footnotes omitted).
"' Professor Chemerinsky has noted additional significant potential ramifications of this
approach:
Although interpreting laws narrowly to avoid constitutional doubts
is not new, its application to the commerce clause gives a powerful tool
to lawyers challenging the application of federal civil and criminal
laws. They need not persuade the Court that a federal statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. Instead, they only need to show that
the application of the law would raise "constitutional doubts." The
Supreme Court never has explained how serious the constitutional
doubts must be; nor has it indicated how plausible the narrowing
construction has to be.
Id. § 3.3.4, at 266.
'"

CHEMERINSKY,
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federal government, and licensed to private parties.' 4 Using the government's
frequencies in furtherance of a murder-for-hire scheme has similarities to using the
47
government's mail system, a scenario unquestionably within federal jurisdiction.1
On the other hand, the distinctions between the wireless spectrum and the mail are
significant: the mail is under the direct supervision and control of government
agents; wireless signals sent out over the electromagnetic spectrum are entirely
within the control of private entities and the government's involvement is more
procedural. Basing a criminal regulation on the federal government's regulatory
authority over the national electromagnetic spectrum opens many possibilities for
future federal criminal jurisdiction, but would surely require revision of § 1958 to
include such a jurisdictional hook before the Supreme Court would consider the
validity of this approach.
For a more direct approach, Congress could easily regulate most intrastate
murders-for-hire by merely requiring actual interstate activity during the commission of the crime. Given the state of technology, an interstate activity requirement
would usually be easily met by a cellular phone call routed interstate, as in Drury,
by a cellular phone search signal that crosses state borders, or even an interstate
paging system signal. Until the Court imposes substantive minimums for interstate
activity, these electronic signals could provide Congress a fertile source for federal
criminal jurisdiction.
B. The Tenth Amendment

The Tenth Amendment reserves for the states powers not delegated to the
federal government in the Constitution. 48 Like the Commerce Clause, the Court's
interpretation of this amendment has evolved over time. 49 The Court has held that
the Tenth Amendment does not limit Congress's commerce power to regulate
private activity, but merely restricts Congress from regulating states as states. 5 ' In
Gregory v. Ashcroft,' 51 the Court employed the Tenth Amendment as a canon of
construction in cases where a federal law would impose a burden on a state
government, requiring a clear statement from Congress that it intended to do so.' 52
146 See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication,82 TEX. L. REv. 863, 871 (2004).
147 Congress derives its authority to regulate the mail from its postal power. U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 7. Section 1958 is unambiguous in its application to anyone who "uses or
causes another.., to use the mail. . . with intent that a murder be committed." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1958(a) (2000).
148 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
1' See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, § 3.9.
150 See id. § 3.9, at 318.
151 Gregory v. Ashcroft,
152 Id. at 460-61.

501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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Regarding § 1958, the burden on states, if it exists at all in the Tenth Amendment
sense, is indirect. First, § 1958 does not regulate states as states, but is aimed at
individuals.'5 3 Furthermore, any federal prosecution of a traditionally local crime
may relieve the state of the burden of prosecution and punishment. 5 4 Thus it
seems a stretch to assert that the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction burdens
states. Indirectly, though, states are burdened with the threat of inconsequence
and the badge of incompetence. As federal criminal law expands, the states'
reputations as competent protectors and enforcers of the law may be damaged. Even
so, as an intangible, incalculable burden, it would not rise to the level of a Tenth
Amendment violation.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY

Two bedrock constitutional concepts are implicated by § 1958: the separation
of powers and federalism. While the purpose of these vertical and horizontal
systems of checks and balances is generally clear, reasonable minds have differed
about the proper constitutional contours of the relationships among the branches and
between states and the federal government. Considering § 1958, the extension of
federal jurisdiction to purely intrastate activity has the potential to harm severely the
delicate balance of federal-state power. Section 1958 could choke the federal courts
with hundreds of essentially local criminal prosecutions and waste federal prosecutorial and investigative resources on crimes that, in most cases, could easily be
handled by local law enforcement. On the other hand, federal intrastate jurisdiction
may foster more and better teamwork among federal, state, and local law enforcement. In addition, it may help put guilty offenders behind bars that would otherwise
remain unprosecuted and reduce the costs of the legal system by fostering a freer
flow of criminal justice resources between states and the federal government. From
a broad perspective, intrastate jurisdiction over these violent crimes may be an
entirely proper and realistic response to the transformation of this country from a
collection of insulated states into an integrated national society and economy.
A. Separationof Powers

With the expansion of federal criminal law over the last thirty-five years,
Congress has substantially increased the power and influence of the executive
branch. 55 Broadly written criminal statutes and far-reaching jurisdictional hooks

153 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
'5

78, § 3.9, at 318.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.6(a)(2) (4th ed. 2003).

155 Meese, supra note 29, at 13.
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give significant power to federal law enforcers in the form of prosecutorial
discretion.' 56
Crafting precise constitutional legislation requires diligence and care, both of
which can easily take a back seat to other more immediate pressures of legislating.
A Congress jealous of its power, as Madison envisioned, 57 is threatened by a
Congress jealous of its incumbency.' s Congressional abnegation of its authority to
dictate the criminal law menu by establishing a generous buffet of criminal law from
which federal prosecutors may freely choose threatens the system of checks and
balances by effectively transferring power to establish priorities in criminal law to
the executive branch. 5 9 The federal judiciary also plays a role in the erosion of the
separation of powers when courts fail to constrain the use of overbroad federal
criminal sanctions."
B. Federalism

Although the word "federalism" never appears in the Constitution, the principle
of a vertical separation of powers between the states and federal government is
central to American democracy. 6' Traditionally, criminal justice has been considered almost entirely within the province of the states.'62 In fact, the Constitution
includes only two generalized powers for federal criminal prosecution - the

'56 Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalizationof Social andEconomic Conduct, LEGAL
MEMORANDUM ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY No. 7 (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), June 25,

2003, at 15, availableat http://www.heritage.org/research/legalissues/lm7.cfm. Prosecutorial
discretion itself arises from the Separation of Powers doctrine. United States v. Armstrong,
517 U.S. 456,464 (1996). Thus this concept is both protected by and endangers the separation of powers.
'57 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
158

Meese, supra note 29, at 11-12, 15-16.

9 Id. at 24, 27.

"6 Id. at 15-16. There are two obvious ways courts may effectively and constitutionally
reign in the use of overbroad federal criminal law. First, they might narrowly interpret
statutory sections to avoid constitutional concerns. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, § 3.3,
at 265-68. Second, through the use of the canon of statutory construction known as constitutional avoidance, courts may narrowly construe a statute to avoid constitutional conflicts
if there are competing plausible interpretations of the statute. Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct.
716,724-25 (2005). See the dissent for a broader interpretation of this canon. Id. at 732-37
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
161 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 324 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed.,
1961) (discussing whether "the powers transferred to the federal government.., will be
dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several states").
162 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) ("Indeed, we can think of no
better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and
reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.").
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power to punish "Offences against the Law of Nations"'63 and the power to "make
all Laws . . . necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
65
- and only specifies three discrete federal crimes 67
piracy, 1 and treason. 1
Powers

' '6

counterfeiting,1

66

The Founding Fathers also intended that the powers of the federal government
would be very limited while the states would possess the lion's share of power and
influence under the Constitution. 68 An interpretation of § 1958 that extends federal
jurisdiction to the prosecution of essentially local crime seems antithetical to this
general principle.
Some scholars argue that Congress's exercise of the commerce power does not
implicate federalism in a specific sense because the Commerce Clause is not a
limit on federal power.' 69 The Commerce Clause grants the federal government
163 U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 8, cl. 10.

164id. at cl. 18.
165 Id. at cl. 6.
166
167

Id. at cl. 10.
Id. at art. III, § 3, cl. 2. Gene Healy cautioned that the federalization of crime, although

well-intentioned, is contrary to the Constitution:
The records of the Constitutional Convention indicate that the
federal role in criminal law was limited by design. At the Philadelphia
Convention, discussion of criminal law issues focused almost exclusively on treason, piracy, counterfeiting, and offenses against the law
of nations. Federal criminal authority, like federal authority in general,
was to be directed in the main toward affairs of state and international
relations, as well as protecting the federal government and its interests.
Gene Healy, There Goes the Neighborhood: The Bush-Ashcroft Plan to "Help" Localities
Fight Gun Crime, POL'Y ANALYSIS No. 440 (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), May 28, 2002,

at 4 (footnotes omitted), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa440.pdf.
168 See, e.g., THE FEDERALISTNO. 45, at 328 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961). Madison argued that there was no need to fear federal encroachment of state
authority:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and
foreign commerce .... The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive
and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments in times of peace and security.
Id.
169 Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism:A Theory of
Commerce-ClauseBasedRegulation of TraditionallyState Crimes,47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
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regulatory authority over commerce among the states with no caveats, exceptions,
170
or restrictions. John Marshall expressed this very concept in Gibbons v. Ogden,
noting that the only restraints on Congress's commerce powers are "[t]he wisdom
and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence
which their constituents possess at elections.'' 1.. Additionally, some claim that
federal criminal legislation must be over-inclusive, including criminal activities
within the purview of local and state law enforcement agencies, to provide federal
prosecutors sufficient flexibility. 7 ' This flexibility would permit the prosecutor
to cooperate with state and local agencies to select the appropriate cases for federal
prosecution. 171
Permitting the mere use of an interstate commerce facility, even purely intrastate, to trigger federal jurisdiction opens wide the door of opportunity for federal
prosecution of essentially local crime, as seen in § 1958. On the other hand, limiting
federal jurisdiction under Lopez and Morrison ties the hands of federal prosecutors
and may result in dangerous criminals remaining free.
C. Expansion of FederalCriminalLaw

The first federal criminal statute was passed by Congress in 1790 and
established several criminal offenses. 174 The new criminal offenses concerned
exclusive federal interests such as theft of federal property, perjury in federal court,
and bribery of federal officers. 171 While post-Civil War Reconstruction and the illfated federal war on alcohol in the early twentieth century were occasions where
Congress greatly increased the number of federal crimes, more than forty percent of
federal crimes were created after 1970. 76 Congress's all-out war on drugs and
organized crime was the impetus for many of these new criminal statutes, of which
the murder-for-hire statute is one example. 77 As the body of federal criminal law
grows, so does the centralization of police power in the hands of the federal
government. 78 Whether this is a positive trend is the subject of much debate.

921, 956-58 (1997). "[Tihe Commerce Clause is plainly not a limitation on federal power
or a source of state power at all." Id. at 558.
170 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
171 Id. at 197.
72 Litman & Greenberg, supra note 169, at 964-66.
173 Id.

17'Healy, supra note

167, at 5.

175 id.

Meese, supra note 29, at 7.
...See 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2000).
78 Meese, supra note 29, at 26.
176
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The explosive expansion of federal criminal law is largely owed to its political
popularity.179 Proposing and passing a law that criminalizes a reprehensible act,
even if the crime is traditionally and purely local in nature, rarely meets with
resistance.' 80 Being tough on crime, regardless of the constitutional implications,
has become a political safety zone. The effect of such political incentive is predictable: similar acts are criminalized in different ways. Because Congress is only
accountable for the passage of legislation, it is free to blame the Executive and
Judicial branches for failing to keep criminals off the streets. The federal murderfor-hire legislation is a perfect example. If no federal law existed to criminalize
murder-for-hire, perpetrators of such acts would remain subject to prosecution by
state authorities under state criminal statutes.
The ramifications are significant. As Congress responds to headlines in its
criminal lawmaking activities, states and localities lose. Over time, popular
perception that the federal government deals best with the toughest crimes, not
necessarily the national ones, erodes the respect and admiration for state and local
This erosion becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as America's best
government.
and brightest head off to the Emerald City with a mild contempt for the perceived
second-class citizen that is state government.
D. Resource Allocation

Notwithstanding the constitutional concerns, extending federal jurisdiction to
essentially local crime, like most murder-for-hire cases, can cause practical
problems, one of which is a serious strain on federal resources.' 82 Federalizing
crime that has traditionally been prosecuted by states opens up new areas of
responsibility for both the Executive and Judicial branches. With authority comes
the burden of enforcement.
As federalization of criminal law taxes federal resources, it also has the potential
to relieve state and local law enforcement of significant responsibility and expense.
However, the benefits may not exceed the costs. As the ABA's 1998 report on the
federalization of criminal law revealed, the reality of increased federalization of
crime does not have a significant impact on the number of prosecutions at the state
"' In fact, many federal crimes are never charged, but merely serve as a handy
level. 83
potentiality if the occasion ever calls."

'9

Id. at 16.

11o Id. at 14-17.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 18, 36-40.
I'l Id. at 19-20.
184 Id. at 20-22.
182
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Federal courts must also bear the heavy load of additional cases on an already
bulging docket. 85 However, supporters of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction
claim that the potential strain on the federal courts is largely blown out of
proportion, and that the huge increase in criminal cases before federal courts is due
18 6
to the dramatic rise in drug charges, not the increased prosecution of local crime.
E. Nationalization
Proponents of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction also find support in the
self-evident nationalization of American society and economy. The same economic
and social trends that gave birth to globalization have left an indelible mark on the
United States: local economies feel the impact of dock strikes thousands of miles
away; residents in rural Georgia would feel right at home in a Seattle Wal-Mart. As
America's economy morphs from a sea of disconnected islands to a seamless web
of commerce, more than Main Street is affected. Pervasive federal regulation, inexpensive and frequent interstate travel, and growth of a national economy have
significantly weakened local culture and regional identity.' 87 As such, some suggest
that the importance of maintaining a strong sense of federalism seems to be
waning. 8 8 Notwithstanding these trends, Congress's current unprincipled approach
to federalizing crime hardly seems pragmatically reasonable, regardless of the
constitutional implications.
CONCLUSION

By revising the federal murder-for-hire statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958, to clear up its
wooly language, Congress stepped out of one problem and into another. While its
proactive resolution of a circuit-splitting statutory ambiguity deserves praise,
Congress's extension of federal jurisdiction to purely intrastate local crime renders
§ 1958 at odds with the Supreme Court's modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 35-39.
Litman & Greenberg, supra note 169, at 973-77. "[T]he increase in the [federal]
criminal docket is not largely attributable to statutes like the Gun-Free School Zone Act that
create concurrent federal jurisdiction over nondrug crimes." Id. at 976.
187 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, § 3.9, at 306 ("[Tlhe notion of radically
limited
federal powers seems anachronistic in the face of a modem national market economy and
decades of extensive federal regulations."). Not only has the country become more homogeneous and interconnected economically, in the last fifty years the judiciary has become
more active in securing individual liberties: "[T]here has been a major shift over time as to
how abusive government is best controlled. Now it is thought that if a federal action intrudes
upon individual liberties, the federal judiciary will invalidate it as unconstitutional. Judicial
review is seen as an important check against tyrannical government actions." id.
185

186

188

id.
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Given the imminent leadership change in the Court, which is currently closely
divided on the proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the Court's consideration of the constitutionality of § 1958 has never been more important. In view
of the Court's opinions in Lopez and Morrison, as well as the harmful constitutional
effects of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction to local crime, the Court should
invalidate § 1958 as exceeding Congress's commerce power. In the alternative, the
Court should narrowly interpret § 1958 to extend jurisdiction only to actual
interstate use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-forhire) 89 Regardless of the outcome, for the sake of clearly defining Congress's
power to criminalize under the Commerce Clause, the constitutionality of
Congress's recent amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1958 deserves Supreme Court review.

189 In recent cases, the Court has narrowly favored interpreting statutes passed under the
commerce power rather than declaring them outright violations of the Constitution.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, § 3.3, at 265-68.
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